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MATTHEW W. FINKIN* AND KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT**
Solving the Employee Reference Problem:
Lessons From the German Experiencet
Employers in the United States confront an inability to secure refer-
ences for prospective employees due to the American legal environment
which does not require that references be given. References are legally
mandated in Germany. This Article explores the workings of these two
legal regimes. Although it does not recommend the adoption of a
mandatory reference system, it argues that much can be learned from
the German experience. It proposes the creation of a legal safe harbor
for a voluntary reference pool.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has a problem: employers have become ex-
tremely reluctant to supply references about employees. As a result, a
number of states have legislated to encourage employers to be more
forthcoming, short, however, of mandating that references be pro-
vided. The Federal Republic of Germany does not have this problem:
it has long mandated that references be given. But that mandate has
generated a complex body of law and a whole semantic system that
has fed into a growing number of legal complaints.
This Article will first describe the situation in the United States,
in practice and in law. It will next do as much for Germany. To the
obvious follow-on question of whether the United States should con-
sider borrowing the German system, the short answer will be no. But
the more interesting question is whether the United States can learn
from the German experience in devising a solution attuned to Ameri-
* Albert J. Harno and Edward W. Cleary Chair in Law, the University of
Illinois.
** Willard & Margaret Carr Professor of Labor & Employment Law, Indiana
University-Bloomington.
t This Article combines and refines the discussion by Kenneth Dau-Schmidt,
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Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 15-17 (2001) and by Matthew Finkin, From
Anonymity to Transparence: Screening the Workforce in the Information Age, 2000
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 403, 442-46 (2000) and Matthew Finkin, Employee References: A
Very Small Study in Comparative Law, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR BERNHARD GROIFELD 265
(Ulrich Huiber & Werner Ebke eds., 1999). It was delivered by Professor Finkin as the
Rush McKnight Labor Law Lecture at the Case Western Reserve Law School on
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can circumstances. The answer to that will be yes: if law can conduce
toward a freer flow of accurate information in the labor market, com-
panies will act accordingly. In other words, the German experience
deepens the economic analysis of legal options and legitimates a more
active role for law even if that law does not necessarily track the Ger-
man system.
II. THE UNITED STATES
A. The Current State of Affairs
In 1992, Ramona Paetzold and Steven Willborn drew attention to
the radical decline in the willingness of employers to provide refer-
ences on prior employees, other than, perhaps, the bare bones of
dates of hire and job duties.1 They attributed this unwillingness to
the fear of being sued for defamation and they went on to document
the irrationality of that decision: employers were no more likely to be
sued-more precisely, no more likely to be sued successfully-than
they had been a generation before when the giving of references was
a standard operating procedure. 2
The consequence is serious both to individuals and to business.
As J. Hoult Verkerke has explained, incomplete and asymmetric in-
formation in the labor market conduces toward three market
imperfections: mismatching-a lack of fit between the candidate and
the job; churning-unproductive job turnover; and scarring-the
wrongful stigmatization of persons who profitably could be em-
ployed. 3 "In an ideal world," he tells us,
Prospective employers would be able to rely on a full and
candid disclosure form [sic] an applicant's former employers
to decide whether the reasons for a particular employment
termination disqualify him or her from consideration for a
job. The problems of mismatching, churning, and scarring
cannot occur in a full-information equilibrium. 4
But today's world is far from ideal: it has been reported that forty
percent of applicant resumes have discrepancies in educational or
1. Ramona Paetzold & Steven Willborn, Employer (Ir)rationality and the Demise
of Employment References, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 123 (1992).
2. In 1979, the Conference Board surveyed 6,000 companies with a response of
between 500 and 600 respondents in each of four sectors-manufacturing, gas and
electric utilities, banking, and insurance-on their personnel practices. The survey
indicated that, in total, these companies checked on applicants' work references about
ninety-seven to ninety-eight percent of the time. Harriet Gordin, Personnel Practices
I: Recruitment, Placement, Training, Communication, The Conference Board Informa-
tion Bulletin No. 89 (1981).
3. J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 115 (1998).
4. Id. at 149.
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employment history; 5 and, in the absence of good information on how
employees have actually performed in prior employment, prospective
employers have increasingly resorted to searches of matters of rebord,
private as well as public, as part of the employment process. 6
The want of employer forthcomingness has been addressed legis-
latively. Florida enacted a job reference law in 1991. Colorado did as
well in 1992; and Alaska did in 1993. But the legislative floodgate
opened shortly thereafter: nine states acted in 1995, twelve in 1996,
and another five in 1997-more than half the states in total. (Seven
more were to go on to address the issue. 7 ) These statutes differ in
detail and pose a number of as yet unanswered technical questions
catalogued by Markita Cooper.8 For the most part, however, they are
devised to discourage groundless litigation by calibrating the quali-
fied privilege the common law accords to job references: they create a
statutory presumption of good faith that shifts the burden from the
employer, to defend a defamation claim by invoking the privilege, to
the plaintiff-employee to defeat it, at least in those jurisdictions
where heretofore the burden rested differently. In essence, as the Su-
preme Court of Rhode Island observed of its statute, this approach
does little more than to codify the common law.9 Unlike German law,
the states have not mandated that references be given.
As of 2001, these laws had not had their desired effect.10 Profes-
sor Cooper speculated at that time that as these laws were still
relatively new, over time employers "may become increasingly aware
of the statutes and more willing to rely on the immunity" they cod-
5. John Matejkovic & Margaret Matejkovic, Whom to Hire: Rampant Misrepre-
sentations of Credentials Mandate the Prudent Employer Make Informed Hiring
Decisions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 827, 832 (2006).
6. MATTHEW FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, ch. 4, § II (2d ed. 2003).
7. The texts of these laws are set out in id., Pt. II.
8. Markita Cooper, Job Reference Immunity Statutes: Prevalent But Irrelevant,
11 CORNELL L.J. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2001). The Missouri statute is discussed in Note, The
New Missouri Employer Immunity Statute: Are Missouri Employers Still Damned If
They Do and Damned If They Don't?, 44 ST. Louis U. L. REV. 693 (2000). The Ohio
statute is discussed in Comment, "To Tell the Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing
but the Truth" Employment References and Tort Liability, 33 U. TOL. L .REV. 847
(2002). The Idaho statute is discussed in Note, The Need for Change in Idaho's Refer-
ence Immunity Statute: A Proposal to Immunize Idaho Employers' Exposure to
Negligent Hiring Claims After Doe v. Garcia, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 343 (1999).
9. Kevorkian v. Glass, 913 A.2d 1043, 1048 (R.I. 2007). See also Frank v. Home
Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d 439 (D. Md. 2007). In Champan v. Ebeling, 945
So.2d 222 (La. App. 2006), the prior employer's allegedly defamatory remarks were
made to a reference checker retained by the prior employee. Inasmuch as the Louisi-
ana reference law applies only to information given "upon request of a prospective
employer or a current or former employee," the issue was treated as a matter of com-
mon law-in fact, the statute was never mentioned-the result analytically and
practically remaining exactly the same. Similarly, in Wylie v. Arnold Transp. Ser-
vices, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 717 (S.D. Ohio 2006), the court analyzed the issue as a
matter of common law, ignoring Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.71 (2001) but reaching
the same result the statute would command.
10. Cooper, supra note 8, at 44-45.
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ify. 1 1 Three years later, that is six years after the wave of reference
protective law crested, the situation has actually worsened.
In 1998, the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM)
surveyed 2,640 of its member human resource (HR) professionals
concerning their practices and experiences regarding background and
reference checks: 854 responded (thirty-two percent), representing a
cross-section of enterprises, enterprise size, and geographic loca-
tions.12 In 2004, SHRM repeated the survey, this time of 2,500 HR
professionals with a response of 345 (eighteen percent); but this sur-
vey was less weighted toward manufacturing and more toward
services than in 1998,13 better to reflect the distribution of jobs in the
economy. The distribution of firm size remained roughly the same.14
In 1998, forty-five percent of the respondents stated that their
organizations refused to provide any information on a former em-
ployee for fear of litigation. In 2004, the share of respondents who
stated they refused to provide any information increased to fifty-
three percent. This increase occurred even though the incidence of
litigation remains a miniscule two percent or less.15 The 1998 survey
was accompanied by a white paper on the spate of reference protec-
tive laws then recently enacted. The author was dubious, absent a
"sure-fire 'guaranty' of immunity," that these measures would be of
any practical effect:
Just as employers have been reluctant to provide extensive
reference information even though the common law provides
qualified immunity, most employers are likely to continue to
minimize the risk of liability simply by withholding informa-
tion. In short, it is easier to keep quiet about an employee
than to even risk the threat and expense of litigation. 16
11. Id. at 46.
12. SHRM, 1998 Reference Checking Survey (1999).
13. SHRM, 2004 Reference and Background Checking Survey Report (Jan. 2005).
14. The respective responding sample of HR managers was:
Frequency of Responding HR Managers by Industry (%)
Industry 1998
Manufacturing 26
Services (Profit & Non-Profit) 13
Health Services 11
2004
16
21
11
15. The percent of firms reporting defamation claims as a result of references on
prior employees in the prior three years was only one percent in the 1998 survey and
two percent in the 2004 survey. In 2004, the survey also asked whether the firm had
been accused in the prior three years of failing to warn another employer about a
former employee who harms or commits a crime at another job. Only one percent of
respondents answered yes to this question. SHRM 1998 and 2004 Survey Reports.
16. Donn Meinderstma, Implications of the 1996 Job Reference Immunity Stat-
utes, in 1998 SHRM Survey, supra note 12, at 28.
390 [Vol. 57
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As Table 1 shows, the author's skepticism was well placed. In
Table 1 we summarize the findings of the SHRM surveys for 1998
and 2004 with respect to the frequency of the type of information the
respondents report providing as a percentage of the entire sample.
For ease of analysis the critical tendency, set out in the last column,
is the percentage of companies that never give out the information
requested. These percentages are summarized in Graph 1. These per-
centages show that, despite the small chance of being sued because of
the contents of a job reference, the proportion of employers who re-
port that they never report reference information is growing and well
over fifty percent for all types of information except for dates of em-
ployment-and fifty-three percent of employers no longer provide
even that innocuous bit of information. At the other end of the spec-
trum a full seventy-six percent of respondents said that they never
report even violent or bizarre behavior.
TABLE 1: FREQUENCY OF REFERENCE INFORMATION
PROVIDED WHEN REQUESTED (%)
1998 2004
Regularly Sometimes Rarely Never Always Sometimes Rarely Never
Dates of 98 1 <1 <1 46 2 0 53
employment
Eligibility for 42 21 9 28 17 15 4 64
rehire
Salary history 41 24 15 20 13 16 7 65
Reason candidate
left previous 19 23 19 39 8 16 6 71
employer
Qualification for a 18 23 16 43 5 14 7 74
particular job
Overall impression 16 22 17 45 4 15 7 74
of employability
Work habits
(absence, tardiness, 13 19 21 47 2 15 7 75
etc.)
Human relations 11 21 19 49 3 13 10 74
skills 1
Personality traits 7 14 24 55 1 9 12 78
Violent/bizarre :78vio r  12 25 55 5 10 9 76behavior
SOURCE: 1998 and 2004 SHRM Survey Reports. Total may exceed 100% due to rounding.
In other words, a state of affairs that is, behaviorally, law-reac-
tive and that has deleterious societal consequences-on both
individuals and, in the aggregate, on business-is likely to persist
despite a widespread effort at legal remediation. The question is
whether a different approach to remedy this situation should be pur-
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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW
GRAPH 1: PERCENTAGE OF HR MANAGERS REPORTING THAT THEY
NEVER DISCLOSE INFORMATION IN THE LISTED CATEGORIES80-
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sued; but because the problem is in part law-driven, the current state
of the law needs first to be sketched.
B. Sources of Potential Liability
The common law imposes no duty on an employer to give a refer-
ence-or a "character" as it was commonly called in the nineteenth
century. The reason for this rule was explained by a British treatise
of 1897:
[Ilf a master were compelled to give a character, it
would necessarily follow that he must be held to the proof of
the character he gives. The burden then cast on the master
would often give rise either to much litigation on the one
hand or to the giving of false characters on the other.17
In this passage, the treatise writer assumes that as there would
be no liability for the giving of a falsely positive reference, employers
would game a reference obligation to avoid liability by giving positive
references across the board; but this is said even as the treatise
writer opines elsewhere that consequential damages would be due to
the prospective employer who relies to its detriment on a knowingly
false recommendation.' 8 An American treatise stated the governing
rule to just that effect in 1913:
17. ERNEST A. PARKYN, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 133 (1897).
18. Id. at 140.
[Vol. 57
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The effect of the authorities seems to be that, where A, by
making statements or by suppressing facts regarding X, in-
duces B to employ X as an agent, A is liable for such
damages as B may sustain through the misconduct of X, al-
though A had no intention of injuring B, or of benefiting
himself.19
The two situations-of false negatives that might injure former
employees and false positives that might injure prospective employ-
ers-should be analyzed separately. As will be seen later, the
German reference law covers both situations; the former directly, the
latter obliquely.
1. False Negatives
The utterance (or "publication") to any third party of an errone-
ous fact that injures a person's ability to practice her trade or
profession-in most jurisdictions, her ability to secure a job-works a
defamation. Note that the communication must be of an injurious
and erroneous fact. Truth is an absolute defense; and non-factual as-
sertions-expressions of mere "opinion"-are not actionable unless
the statement expressly or tacitly conveys a factual and so testable
predicate.
It is universally recognized that when such a communication, at
once false and injurious, is made by a prior employer to a prospective
employer it is protected nevertheless by a qualified privilege.20 I.e.,
the law recognizes that some injurious falsehood may inevitably be
uttered in the reference process and that it is better for society that
references be communicated even at the cost of possible reputational
19. 5 C.B. LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 2033 at
6306 (2d ed. 1913) (emphasis added) (references omitted). The "authorities" cited are
two. Foster v. Charles, 7 Bing. 103 (1830) (the facts are detailed in 6 Bing. 396
(1830)), which does support the proposition, and Wilkin v. Reed, 15 C.B. 191 (1854),
which is far less categorical. In that case a lawyer had recommended a clerk to an-
other lawyer, to manage the latter's office. The clerk had stolen from the first lawyer
but had repented and been forgiven. He was actually terminated by the first lawyer
because of a fall off in business, which was the reason given for his discharge to the
second lawyer. After the clerk was hired, he embezzled from his new employer. The
second lawyer sued the first for fraud, for misstating the true ground of discharge. As
the ground of discharge was in fact the one given, the plaintiff sought to amend his
pleading to allege wrongful suppression of the employee's prior bad act. Thus the
court disallowed amendment on procedural grounds; that was the holding in the case.
But in dictum on whether that suppression would have been actionable the judges
were dubious: Judge Crowder and Chief Judge Jervis opined of such suppression that
there was "no ground of action" and "no cause of action" respectively, but without
explanation. In colloquy, Judge Creswell observed, "Many cases might be supposed
where it would not only be unnecessary, but cruel and unjustifiable, to disclose a sin
of which the clerk had repented, and for which he had obtained forgiveness."
20. The Connecticut Supreme Court, in what it termed a case of first expression
in that jurisdiction, recently acknowledged and joined in that view. Miron v. Univer-
sity of New Haven Police Dept., 931 A.2d 847 (Conn. 2007).
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injury, and the particular plaintiffs loss of a prospective job or jobs,
than that they not be communicated at all. What would cause the
privilege to be defeated in some jurisdictions is actual malice, a lie
told with an intent to injure; or legal malice, a lie told with knowledge
of its falsity or with reason to know its falsity when uttered-some-
times called "reckless or wanton disregard" of the truth of the matter
asserted; or, in a few jurisdictions, a lie told with belief in its truth
but uttered without adequate investigation into the truth of the mat-
ter.2 1 For the most part, the recent reference statutes apply the
actual or legal malice standards and place the burden of proof on the
plaintiff to negate a statutory presumption of good faith accorded the
employer.
2. False Positives
A false positive can consist either of a factual misstatement or
the suppression of a fact that would bear upon the employee's likely
future performance or behavior, e.g., a statement that the prior em-
ployee was at all times in good standing when in fact she had
resigned under threat of discharge for misconduct. The early treatise
writers just discussed maintained that both British and American
law would hold employers accountable for a reference's misstatement
or suppression on which a prospective employer relies and as a result
of which it suffers consequential damages. Whether that account was
accurate and whether (and why) the law changed, if, indeed, it has, it
suffices to say here that several more recent U.S. cases proceed from
the contrary assumption: that ordinarily a prior employer is not lia-
ble to the current employer or to some other third party-the current
employer's employees or clients who might be injured by the prior
employee's misconduct-on the theory that there is no duty to warn
in the absence of a "special relationship" to a foreseeable victim. 22
In Neptuno Treuhand- und Verwaltungsgesellschaft MBH v. Ar-
bor,23 to take a rather striking example, Neptuno, a German
company, agreed to hire an American commodities future trader on
the express condition that he provide a letter of reference from his
prior employer "attesting to his experience, competence and integrity
as a commodities future trader."24 The former employer provided the
following:
21. The caselaw is collected by FINKIN, supra note 6, at 192-93, 195-99. Publica-
tion to a wider audience than is necessary for the purpose of the privilege will also
defeat it. Id. at 324-28. See, e.g., Rosen v. Mendivil, 225 S.W.3d 181 (Tex. App. 2005).
22. E.g., Murdock v. Higgins, 559 N.W.2d 639 (Mich. App. 1997); Franconi v.
Rault, 521 So. 2d 1189 (La. App. 1988); Cohen v. Wales, 518 NYS 2d. 633 (App. Div.
1987) (failure of prior employer to reveal teacher's sexual misconduct to prospective
employer).
23. 692 N.E.2d 812 (Ill. App. 1998).
24. Id. at 814.
394 [Vol. 57
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I have known Tom Farrell personally for over 13 years. He
was an active full member of the Chicago Board of Trade.
Tom has always proven to be an intelligent industrious and
innovative young man. 25
What the letter did not reveal was that Farrell was under an
order from the Chicago Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) barring
him for two years from trading on his own account or in any other
account in which he had an interest and that his brokerage registra-
tion had been permanently revoked. Farrell was hired on the
strength of this reference and proceeded to trade beyond the limit
Neptuno placed on him resulting in a loss to Neptuno of $5 million.
Neptuno sued Arbor, the former employer, for the failure to dis-
close-and lost. The court held there was no duty to disclose; but, the
court also reasoned that as the CFTC's actions were a matter of pub-
lic record, Neptuno's sole reliance on the letter in making its hiring
decision, its failure more fully to investigate Farrell's background,
was unreasonable.
However, other jurisdictions have imposed a duty of candor in
disclosure: in two cases where the suppressed information concerned
the prospect of "risk of foreseeable physical harm" resulting from the
employee's hire;2 6 and, in a third, where a reference on a bookkeeper
failed to state that the employee had been discharged for theft and
had been convicted for it.27 The facts alleged in the latter were suffi-
cient to survive a motion to dismiss even though a criminal
background check could have been conducted; that is, as in Neptuno,
there were other means available to learn of the applicant's record.
In sum, the courts at present seem to be at 6s and 7s on liability
for falsely positive or misleading references. The issue of non-disclo-
sure is especially vexing because, even as with hindsight one might
well discern a causal chain in a non-disclosure resulting in physical
25. Id.
26. Davis v. Board of County Commissioners, 987 P.2d 1172, 1182 (N.M. App.
1999) (corrections officer about to be subject to disciplinary hearing for the sexual
abuse of inmates was given a glowing recommendation without mention of the pend-
ing charges); Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997)
(school administrator forced to resign for engaging in sexual misconduct with a stu-
dent was given a reference recommending him "without reservation" and molested a.
student in the school that hired him).
27. Fluid Technology, Inc. v. CVJ Axles, Inc., 964 P.2d 614 (Colo. App. 1998). The
court followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(1) (1976), finding there to be a
"pecuniary interest" on the prior employer's part in the transaction, i.e., that the want
of any consideration going to the prior employer did not mean that it did not have a
pecuniary interest in the transaction. However, the court does not identify what that
pecuniary interest was save that the recommendation was given in the course of the
business. If that reading is correct then the courts that have found no duty have all
erred. This reading of § 552(1) was explicitly rejected by the Washington Court of
Appeals in Richland Sch. Dist. v. Mabton Sch. Dist., 45 P.3d 580, 586 (Wash. App.
2002), discussed infra.
2009] 395
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harm or economic loss and which could drive a court toward a finding
of liability, one can also conceive of circumstances where the disclo-
sure of potentially harmful information might well be unnecessarily
prejudicial or injurious to the employee at the time.28
How delicate this judgment might be is illustrated in the decision
of the Washington Court of Appeals in Richland School District v.
Mabton School District.29 A school custodian who had worked for
Mabton was criminally charged with child molestation. In return for
the dismissal of the criminal charge he agreed to resign as custodian;
but the school district, after concluding its own investigation, rehired
him as a school bus driver. It also gave him a glowing letter of recom-
mendation as a custodian and, a year later, he was hired as a
custodian by Richland. After a Richland student, the custodian's
nephew, complained of the custodian's having inquired of where he,
the nephew, was living, Richland investigated the employee's back-
ground, discovered the prior criminal charge, and dismissed him in
part for falsifying his employment application by failing to mention
that episode. The discharge was taken to arbitration by the custo-
dian's union and he was exonerated. The arbitrator noted "the
tension between the public policy of presumed innocence and the
need to protect children from abuse. °30 Nevertheless,
The arbitrator's 74-page decision thoroughly examines the
facts leading up to Mr. Caballero's [the custodian] criminal
charges and the complaint by the nephew. According to the
record before the arbitrator, the allegations of molestation
(involving members of his wife's family) changed during the
course of the investigation, were disputed among family
members, appeared to be tied to divorce proceedings, and
were treated by Mabton officials as a "family squabble."...
Because Mabton regarded Mr. Caballero as innocent of the
charges, it hired him as a substitute bus driver after he
resigned. 31
Richland then sued Mabton for the payments it made to the cus-
todian to settle the matter post-arbitration and for the cost of the
arbitration. The Washington Court of Appeals held that Mabton
could not be liable for not disclosing that which the employee did not
wrongly withhold:
The charges of child molestation apparently were not con-
firmed by the police investigation and were dismissed, albeit
with the proviso that Mr. Caballero agree to resign from the
28. See supra note 19.
29. 45 P.3d 580 (Wash. App. 2002).
30. Id. at 585.
31. Id. at 584.
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school district. Mabton officials, with some personal knowl-
edge of the parties involved in the allegations, decided that
the charges were baseless. 32
Prospective employers commonly inquire why the applicant left
and examine his eligibility for rehire. 33 From what appeared, the cus-
todian left his position voluntarily and had been rehired in another
capacity involving student contact. Thus the question was whether
Mabton should have volunteered that the custodian resigned from
that custodial position on condition of withdrawal of criminal
charges. That statement would have been accurate as far as it went-
but as a partial account it would have been misleading. Should a
more complete statement, e.g., that the custodian had "resigned on
condition of the withdrawal of what the administration believed were
baseless criminal charges of child molestation," have been made or
would that have been unduly prejudicial? Is that decision better
made in hindsight, a judgment of what should have been said in light
of subsequent events, or might it better be secured in advance of dis-
closure, as a protection for the employee's job prospects and a safe
harbor for the employer? Do the twin goals of accuracy and fairness
suggest that the person affected, the employee, should be able to be
heard on the content of the reference? As we will see later, German
law does so by allowing the content of the reference to be challenged.
We will return to this aspect toward the close.
C. Remedial Alternatives
Four options have been discussed: (1) better managerial educa-
tion, (2) absolute privilege, (3) the market, and (4) mandatory
references. Let us look to each.
1. Education
It may be that as the need for accurate references becomes ever
more pressing, employers will come to realize the irrationality of
their overreaction to the prospect of litigation. A business columnist
has recently opined that, "in the real world"-that is, despite fear of
lawsuits-"more people appear to be agreeing to give references," as
employers recognize the importance of sharing such information "to
both the employer and the employee," quoting an owner of an online
career information company.34 Even though that would solve the
problem, no data supporting the "appear to" have been supplied.
32. Id. at 587. The court concluded that the alleged misrepresentations failed to
present a "substantial, foreseeable risk for physical injury in that any person suffered
physical harm." Id.
33. See supra Table 1.
34. Phyllis Korkki, The Care and Feeding of References, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2,
2007), Sunday Business, at 15 (quoting Mark Oldman of Vault.com).
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From what appears, the current state of affairs seems likely to
persist.
2. Absolute Privilege
The law might accord references an absolute privilege instead of
a qualified one. The Kansas reference law moves in this direction. It
accords an absolute privilege from any civil liability for the communi-
cation of dates of employment, pay level, job description and duties,
and wage history; and it extends this immunity to supplying the fol-
lowing upon the written request of a prospective employer:
(1) written employee evaluations which were conducted
prior to the employee's separation from the employer and to
which an employee shall be given a copy upon request; and
(2) whether the employee was voluntarily or involunta-
rily released from service and the reasons for the
separation.35
To similar effect, the New York Court of Appeals has accorded an
absolute privilege to the contents of Form U-5 mandated by the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers giving the employer's reason
for the termination of a broker, which forms are made accessible to
prospective employers and customers.36 The latter decision was not
without dissent, however, for an absolute privilege allows the prior
employer to speak with impunity.37
The prospect of abuse is real.38 Accordingly, the question be-
comes whether the societal need for informational transparency
justifies the adventitious injury that a qualified privilege might re-
quire an employee to endure (except for the sufferance of intentional
35. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-119a (2000).
36. Rosenberg v. Metlife, Inc., 866 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 2007).
37. Id. at 445, 446 (Pigott, J., dissenting). Cf Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home,
Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. App. 1990), declining to impose an obligation to reveal
harmful information. "It is all too easy to envision a career destroyed by malefic infor-
mation released by a disgruntled employer." Id. at 102.
38. In Maine the U-5 is subject to a qualified, not an absolute privilege.
Galarneau v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 504 F.3d 189 (1st Cir. 2007). In
that case, a jury verdict for the terminated broker on the basis of the content of her U-
5 was sustained. There was adequate evidence for the jury to conclude that the
ground given for her discharge, that she had "'engaged in inappropriate bond trading
on a client's account'," for trades made subject to Merrill Lynch's review and approved
by it, was uttered either with knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard of the
truth. In Rosensweig v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 494 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2007), a
broker claimed the Form U-5 worked in the tort of intentional interference in prospec-
tive economic advantage in an arbitration under the rules of the National Association
of Securities Dealers: i.e., that the ground given for his termination was not true and
was given in order to prevent his gaining employment as a broker in that area. The
arbitrator agreed, awarded damages, and ordered the record expunged. The Court of
Appeals enforced the arbitrator's award in full.
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or wanton harm).39 It is doubtful that we should be prepared to allow
an employer to escape legal scrutiny altogether when, for example, it
knowingly asserts a completely baseless accusation of malfeasance as
the ground of discharge, 40 uses the reference as a retaliatory de-
vice,41 or uses the threat of a malicious reference as a disciplinary
cudgel. This option would be a disproportionate response to the refer-
ence problem.
3. The Market
The reference problem poses an interesting conundrum for the
market since three parties have divergent interests in its outcome.
The first employer has an interest in using references to encourage
and reward good work and to discourage and punish bad perform-
ance. Unfortunately it may be costly to the first employer to produce
an accurate reference, and unscrupulous employers may use refer-
ences for personal revenge. The employee has an interest in a positive
reference, to reward him for a good performance, or to allow him to
escape the costs of a bad performance. The second employer has an
interest in an accurate reference to allow him to pick the best pro-
spective employee and match employees to appropriate jobs.
Although their interests diverge, there is little doubt that the parties,
and society as a whole, have an interest in the accurate production of
reference information to encourage and reward good work and accu-
rately to match employees to their jobs.
These divergent interests make it difficult for any two of the
three parties adequately to resolve this problem through contract ne-
gotiations. If negotiations are left to only the first employer and the
employee, the obvious solution is to tend toward a positive reference.
Effective liability on the part of the first employer to the second for a
false positive is necessary to check this effect. If negotiations are left
to only the first and second employer, the first employer would tend
39. In Butler v. Delaware Otsego Cop., 650 NYS 2d 483 (App. Div. 1996), the
malicious disclosure of harmful information from an employee's personnel record was
held actionable. If the disclosure were to meet one of the categories set out in the
Kansas law it would not be actionable in that jurisdiction.
40. El-Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, 496 F.3d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (em-
ployer bad faith deprived the utterance of qualified privilege).
41. In Pasqualini v. Mortgageit, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 2d 659 (SDNY 2007), the prior
employer informed a prospective one that the employee is "'a psychopathic liar and
whore who repeatedly makes fraudulent complaints about her co-workers and superi-
ors merely to cover up for her own laziness and incompetence [.1" The employee, a
manager at a mortgage lender, had complained that a senior loan officer repeatedly
touched her forcibly on her buttocks and breast. As he was the company's "top
earner," id. at 663, the employee alleged that the company did nothing. Eventually,
the employee filed a criminal complaint against the loan officer. The loan officer
pleaded guilty and a permanent order of protection was entered in the employee's
favor. The employee asserted that her superiors told her she "would pay for what she
did" and terminated her. The statement quoted was allegedly made by her superior to
a prospective employer nine months after she commenced a lawsuit against the firm.
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to give negative evaluations since this would tend to limit the possi-
bility of later damages on breach of contract. 42 Effective liability on
the part of the first employer to the employee for a false negative is
necessary to check this effect and the possibility of personal revenge.
Once third party liability to either the second employer or the em-
ployee is a possibility, this creates what Verkerke has described as
the "coordination problem" in that the second employer who receives
the reference gets all of the benefit of the reference and none of the
liability risk, and the first employer who produces the reference bears
all of the risk of liability and gets none of the benefit of the refer-
ence.43 Indeed, as one of us has previously argued, it is the fact that
the first employer bears only potential costs and no benefits, not the
actual size of potential employer liability for references, which drives
the current dearth of job references. 44
As Verkerke has pointed out, theoretically the coordination prob-
lem could be solved by an "ongoing reciprocal arrangement to
exchange reference information."4 5
One employer might agree with other local employers to pro-
vide candid assessments of former employees who apply to
work for those other employers. In return, the other employ-
ers would disclose similar information about their former
employees. 46
Unfortunately, as Verkerke also notes, private intermediaries are un-
likely to facilitate such exchanges of information because of the
asymmetry of information involved and the limitations of pricing. If
the intermediary sets one price for a reference, employers will pro-
vide references only if they in truth, or by design, have potential
liability less than that price. If the intermediary pays more for the
really valuable bad or good information, he gives employers incentive
to exaggerate the value of their information and distort the
reference. 47
Regardless of the economic theory, it seems clear that in the cur-
rent legal environment the market is not solving the problem by
providing an adequate number of employment references. A reference
pool would solve the coordination problem, but if it relies on the mar-
42. The employers might address this problem by making the first employer's
compensation for a favorable reference depend in part on the employee's later per-
formance. The fact that we do not see such arrangements commonly in the market
suggests that transaction costs in validating the employee's later performance and
enforcing the agreement are prohibitive.
43. Verkerke, supra note 3.
44. Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Tech-
nology: Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L. J. 1, 15-16 (2001).
45. Verkerke, supra note 3, at 171.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 171-73.
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ket, that is on private agreement, it is incapable of addressing the
core of the conundrum which lies in the prospect of legal liability,
unless the participants in the pool conclude that the information they
secure outweighs the prospect of liability of which some examples can
be found, notably in trucking.48 Behavior that is law driven, even ir-
rational behavior, may call for a change in law.
4. Mandatory References
The notion most widely discussed is of a mandatory system of
reference exchange, which German law accomplishes. Professor Ver-
kerke has argued that mandatory disclosure would be a will o' the
wisp: the information of most use to a prospective employer, apart
from evidence of demonstrable malfeasance-acts of workplace vio-
lence, persistent unexcused absenteeism, and the like-are
subjective assessments of productivity, performance, and personality,
that are inherently unverifiable. 49 As he explains,
[E]mployment references normally include subjective per-
formance assessments .... [T]he underlying observations
that support employers' performance appraisals are often far
more difficult to verify than a debtor's payment history. In
order to defend the truth of their negative judgments, em-
ployers must testify about employee shortcomings such as
inept or lackadaisical job performance, insubordinate com-
ments or behavior, and the amorphous problem of a "bad
attitude." Evidence that is so inherently fluid and indefinite
can never be sufficient to prevail on summary judgment [in
defamation] and often leaves an employer uncertain about
the likely outcome at trial.50
48. Some credit reporting agencies cater to specialized labor markets. DAC Ser-
vices, a subsidiary of USIS, for example, purchases so-called "DAC reports," a
standard termination record form setting out entries, akin to that set out in Table 1,
supra, from participating employers. It estimates that more than 6,000 carriers con-
stituting eighty-five percent of the largest carriers utilize its services. When a trucker
applies for a job with a participating carrier he or she will be asked to consent to the
screening-actually the release-of his or her DAC report as required by the Fair
Credit Reporting Act. See www.thecybertruckstop.comfDS/dac-info.html (last visited
Apr. 14, 2008). And in compliance with that Act, if the driver contests the accuracy of
the report, DAC Service has to reconfirm with the prior employer. If the prior em-
ployer insists on the accuracy of what it said, the employee may place a rebuttal on
the record which is attached to the DAC report. Drivers have complained of the sys-
tematic abuse this system allows: to blackball "those drivers who stood up for their
rights insuring a compliant, more easily exploited work force." Paragraph 19(h) of the
Complaint, in Owner-Operator Indep. Driver Ass'n., Inc. v. USIS Commercial Ser-
vices, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (D. Colo. 2005).
49. Id. at 135, 150.
50. Id. at 175. He speculated that after the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), the courts would most
likely find actionable in defamation, as necessarily implying the existence of defama-
tory negative facts, that which previously was held to be inactionable as mere
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In fact, most of the reported appellate decisions in the matter of
employee references are on review of decisions on summary judg-
ment, in which, however, employers often prevail. Consequently, the
costs that cause employers to shrink from providing references are
not necessarily the extensive costs of a trial, to verify the factual
grounding of their subjective judgments, but the costs of appearing in
court at all: not the prospect of failing to persuade in a motion for
summary judgment, but the cost of making the motion.
In the event, Verkerke argues that little would prevent manag-
ers from gaming a mandatory reference system by providing only
positive references: just as false negatives could routinely be used or
threatened to discipline the workforce, false positives could be used
systematically to secure voluntary resignations, to "unload undesir-
able employees on the labor market."51 That might be legislated
against by requiring truthful assessments but, he argues, such a re-
gime "might prevent employers from signaling their level of
satisfaction with former employees by providing positive references
with different degrees of enthusiasm."52 And such a prohibition
would pose the same problem of verification and the cost of verifica-
tion as would be imposed on defending a negative evaluation.
Is there a way to test these hypotheses? America has experi-
mented with mandatory disclosure but-with the exception of
"service letter" laws enacted at the turn of the twentieth century to
combat blacklisting, especially for union activity in railroading 53-
these are too narrowly focused and specialized to test these proposi-
tions.54 The service letter laws might provide a legal laboratory, but
expressions of "opinion." Almost two decades later, that has not happened. Opinion
continues to be inactionable. MATTHEW FINKIN, 2008 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT TO PRI-
VACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (2d ed. 2003) at 154 (references omitted) (all references to
cases decided in 2002 and subsequently):
Characterizations of an employee as being lazy-or being a "cancer" on
the team, or of being incompetent-were held inactionable matters of opin-
ion. Indeed, employers are accorded considerable leeway in how they
characterize an employee's performance, short of allegations of criminal or
other serious misbehavior. A college official's letter observing of a professor
who had been denied tenure that he spent too much time on material unre-
lated to his courses, was rude and "unprofessionally candid" and was
inactionable, as opinion, as was a school principal's mention of a teacher as
"burnt out," "lazy," "unstable," and "looking for sympathy."
Post 1990, as before, however, there is a lack of consistency in just when a court will
find an opinion to imply a defamatory fact. Id. at 155-56.
51. Verkerke, supra note 3, at 166.
52. Id. at 168 (footnote omitted).
53. See, e.g., SHELTON STROMQUIST, A GENERATION OF BOOMERS: THE PATTERN OF
A RAILROAD LABOR CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 239 (1987). These
laws are discussed by F.H. STIMSON, HANDBOOK TO THE LABOR LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 61 (1907) and FRANK CARLTON, LABOR PROBLEMS 186 (1933).
54. E.g., the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 requires reporting of
adverse actions taken against certain health care practitioners including license revo-
cation, suspension, reprimand, censure or probation, which is to be made available to
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with the singular exception of Missouri, these seem to have become
dead letters; and the Missouri statue has been read in such a way as
to avoid these issues. 55
Consequently, one might turn to foreign legal systems to see if
one might supply a legal experiment whose experience-with all the
caution incumbent in considering a different culture, social as well as
legal-might shed light on whether the consequences Verkerke es-
says have been realized. As it turns out, German law has had a long
and deep experience with mandatory references and its experience
may prove insightful.
III. ZEUGNIS: THE GERMAN LAW OF EMPLOYEE REFERENCES 5 6
The roots of modern German reference law have been traced to
the police regulations of the sixteenth century where the documenta-
tion for migratory miners, artisans, and servants was closely
regulated.5 7 The modern law took shape in the Industrial Code of the
North German Federation of 1869. A "guiding principle" of the Indus-
trial Code was the freedom of employment.58 Consequently, a means
was sought for applicants to demonstrate their suitability for hire
health care entities who may be entering an employment relationship with such per-
sons. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-2 (2000). In addition, the states are required to maintain
registries of nurse's aides including any findings of abuse, neglect or misappropriation
of property, which information must be made available on request. 42 C.F.R.
§ 483.156 (2007). As noted earlier, the National Association of Securities Dealers re-
quires its members to file a form, Form U-5, when an employee is terminated stating
the reason for termination; the employee may add a rebuttal on a separate form.
These forms are publicly accessible. See supra notes 36-37. The Pilot Records Im-
provement Act of 1996, 49 U.S.C. § 44936 (2000 & Supp. v. 2005), requires a
prospective employer of a pilot to secure specified information from those who had
employed the applicant within the previous five years, including disciplinary actions,
terminations, or disqualifications from employment; and it requires the prospective
employee to agree to a release of that information. The law requires that the pilot be
given notice that a request for records has been made, be given a copy of the informa-
tion disclosed (if requested), and be given an opportunity to submit written
corrections before a final hiring decision is made. Absolute privilege is accorded the
information transmitted in accordance with the Act so long as it is not knowingly
false; and state law is preempted. See Sky Fun 1, Inc. v. Schuttlofell, 27 P.3d 361
(Colo. 2001).
55. The Missouri law requires the employer to state the "true" cause of the dis-
charge or quit. The Supreme Court of Missouri has held this to mean the cause the
employer acted upon must be stated even if it was incorrect. Labrier v. Anheuser
Ford, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 51, 57 n.2 (Mo. 1981) (en banc). Thus, if the employee was
discharged because the employer erroneously believed the employee had stolen, the
statement "discharged for theft" would be a true statement under the Act. Newman v.
Greater Kansas City Baptist & Community Hosp. Ass'n., 604 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. App.
1980).
56. For much of what follows, the authors wish to express their appreciation to
Rolf Birk, Martin Kraushaar, Sebastian Krebber, Dieter Sadowski, and Spiros
Simitis, even as any errors remain the authors'.
57. Hein Schlei3mann, Historisches zum Arbeitszeugnis, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
ARBEITSRECHT [NZA] 2006, p. 13 92 .
58. A. SARTORIOUS VON WALTERSHAUSEN, DEUTSCHE WIRTSCHAFMGESCHICHTE
1815-1914, 227 (1923).
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even as employers sought a means to select the better qualified-and
to turn away those who had been dismissed for neglect or incompe-
tence or for engaging in a strike or other forms of insubordination. 59
The problem was addressed in section 113 of the Code. As origi-
nally enacted it contained two provisions: (1) that upon leaving
employment the worker can demand a certificate stating the type and
duration of his employment, and (2) that at the worker's request the
certificate is to extend to the worker's conduct (Fiuhrung). This provi-
sion was amended in 1891 to add "performance" (Leistungen) to the
second clause and to add a provision forbidding employers to affix
notations or marks (Merkmale) to the certificate with the purpose of
characterizing the employee in a manner that is not apparent from
the wording. This provision was taken by the industrial arbitration
courts (Gewerbegerichte) to forbid the use of any symbols, special pa-
per, color, script or stamp that might carry a secret negative
meaning;60 in effect, to proscribe what in American parlance would
be a "blacklist."61 The former two requirements (as amended) were
carried over into the Commercial Code of 1897 and embodied in turn
in § 630 of the Civil Code (BGB) in 1900. In 2003, this provision was
transferred from the Civil Code to the Industrial Code (§ 109 GewO)
including the express prohibition of Merkmale.
A. Basic Elements
As one might imagine of a provision more than a century old and
actively litigated, there is a substantial body of law and commen-
tary-legal treatises and practical guides 62-devoted to the subject of
the German job reference law. For our purposes, only the basic ele-
ments of the system need be outlined.
At the end of an employment relationship, whether by quit or
discharge, the employee is entitled to a written reference (Zeugnis) at
his or her request. The failure to supply the reference in a timely
fashion could result in the award of money damages if the employee
can prove the loss of a job or jobs as a result.6 3
The reference may be either unqualified, i.e., one that gives only
the nature and length of the employee's employment, or qualified,
i.e., one that gives the employer's estimation of the employee's per-
59. ELAINE SPENCER, MANAGEMENT AND LABOR IN IMPERIAL GERMANY 41-42
(1984).
60. ROBERT VON LANDMANN & GUSTAV ROHMER, KOMMENTAR ZUR GEWERBE-
ORDNUNG FOR DAs DEUTSCHE REICH § 113 (7th ed. 1925).
61. See, e.g., LAWRENCE SHOFER, THE FORMATION OF A MODERN LABOR FORCE: UP-
PER SILESIA, 1865-1914, 130 (1975) (on efforts to set up a "blacklist" of workers who
quit without giving notice).
62. Of the latter, see HEIN SCHLEMANN, DAs ARBEITSZEUGNIS (18th ed. 2007) and
KARLHEINZ DIETZ, ARBEITSZEUGNISSE: AUSTELLEN UND BEURTEILEN (11th ed. 1999).
63. Judgment of the Federal Labor Court (BAG) of Oct. 25, 1967 reported in Der
Betriebs Berater [BBI 1968, p. 546.
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formance (Leistung) and conduct or behavior (Verhalten). The
Supreme Court in Civil Matters, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), has
held that the reference bears a two-fold obligation: to benefit the em-
ployee by facilitating his or her ability to secure a job-an obligation
of benevolence (Wohlwollen)-and to benefit the prospective em-
ployer by giving the employer an accurate picture an obligation of
truthfulness (Wahrheit). In the event of a conflict between these two
goals, the obligation of truthfulness is supposed to take priority. As
the federal labor court, the Bundesarbeitgesricht (BAG), put it, "The
reference may not contain anything false; it also may not omit that
which the reader of a reference expects." 64 The legal obligation is one
that therefore cannot be contracted around by the employer and em-
ployee.65 But commentators almost routinely advert to the tension
between these dual obligations, if not the impossibility of reconciling
them.
In order to police false negatives, not only may an employee seek
an order from the labor court 66 requiring an employer to correct its
reference, but in some cases money damages may be sought under
the Civil Code, § 280 1 BGB, if the employee can prove a breach of the
duty and a resulting loss. 6 7 In terms of policing false positives, as
there is no contractual relationship between the prior employer and
the prospective one giving rise to an obligation, § 280 I BGB would
not apply. But damages might be available under § 826 BGB which
renders a person who "in a manner contrary to good morals [die guten
Sitten] intentionally inflicts damage to another person" liable for the
consequential damages. In fact, in two cases, the BGH did apply
§ 826 BGB to render a prior employer liable for the economic loss in-
curred by a current one for the failure of their references to mention
that the employee had embezzled. In the first case, the court observed
that a reference must contain the basic facts for the total assessment
of the employee in the interests of the future employer; that it must
do so in order to foster the employee's career, i.e., the obligation of
benevolence, but that it finds its limit-or border (Grenze)-in the
case where silence provides a basically inaccurate account. In the sec-
ond case, the employer had given the employee, a bookkeeper, the
64. Judgment of the BAG of July 29, 1971 reported in BB 1971, p. 1280.
65. Judgment of BAG of June 6, 1960 reported in BB 1960, p. 983.
66. The labor court system entails a court of first instance (ArbG) consisting of a
professional judge and two lay judges representing employers and employees-the
latter meaning union designees. There is a small filing fee and a mandatory effort at
conciliation failing which the case is heard. The unsuccessful party may appeal to an
intermediate labor court (LAG) composed in the same manner; in effect, it rehears the
case. Appeal on legal issues can be taken to the federal labor court (BAG). The vast
majority of claims before the labor courts are disposed of in a matter of a few months.
67. Section 280(1) provides: "If the obligor fails to comply with a duty arising
under the obligation, the oblige may claim compensation for the loss resulting from
this breach. This does not apply if the obligor is not liable for the failure."
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following reference: "We know Mr. Sp. as a reliable and conscientious
employee. He has performed all his assigned duties to our complete
satisfaction."68 Some months later the prior employer learned of the
former employee's embezzlement. The BGH held that the prior em-
ployer's failure to notify the current employer rendered the prior
employer liable in damages for the resulting economic loss.
6 9
B. In Practice
In practice the obligation to give a benevolent but accurate ac-
count of an employee's on-the-job performance and behavior has
given rise to an elaborate system couched, in Orwellian terms, in
"Reference Speak"-Zeugnissprache-the "walking on eggs of coded
references."70 How this semiotic system works can be gleaned from
examples set out in one practical guide, 71 relying on decisions of the
labor court, explaining how to phrase the following levels of perform-
ance evaluation:
Outstanding Performance
"She has always completed her assigned duties to our fullest
[vollste] satisfaction."
The author notes that fullest-vollste-is not good German, but in
Zeugnissprache it is the accepted usage.
Above Average Performance
"He has always completed his assigned duties to our full
satisfaction."
Note that the employee "always" (stets) performed to the employer's
"full" (vollen) satisfaction.
68. BGH Judgment of May 15, 1979 reported in BB 1980, p. 779.
69. Is it any wonder that Neptuno, a German company hiring a trader to work in
Germany, would require that the applicant to supply a reference? See text accompa-
nying supra notes 23-25. Is it any wonder then that the prior employer's concealment
of critical facts which lead to the employee's hire, and to Neptuno's losses, should have
resulted in Neptuno's lawsuit against the reference-giver? What is puzzling is why
Neptuno, suing in Illinois where the prior employer was capable of being sued, for an
act that had its foreseeable effect in Germany, did not attempt to claim that German
law applied. The authors confess that they have not researched Illinois' choice of law
rules. But it suffices to say that the Illinois court's opinion, that Neptuno's reliance on
the reference was unreasonable, failed to appreciate the legal system in which Nep-
tuno operated.
70. Manfred Schweres, Zwischen Warhrheit und Wohlwollen: Zum Eiertanz
kodierter Zeugniserteilung, BB 1986, p. 1572. Literally Eiertanz is "dancing on eggs."
71. DIETZ, supra note 62, at 37-38.
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Satisfactory (or Average) Performance
"He has completed his assigned duties to our full
satisfaction."
"Full" but not "always."
* Below Average-between satisfactory and merely sufficient
"He has always completed his assigned duties to our
satisfaction."
"Always," but not "full."
Below Average-merely sufficient
"He has completed his assigned duties to our satisfaction."
Neither "always" nor "full."
Defective Performance
"For the most part he completed his assigned duties to our
satisfaction."
And some characterizations are simply forbidden, such as the rather
arch locution, "You'd be lucky if you could get Mr. X to work for you."
This merely gives the reader a hint of how the system works.
There is a good deal more of what can and what cannot be said. Even
the closing of the reference is coded: it has become the norm to wish
the departing worker the best of success in her new position and the
failure to do so has been litigated as implicitly sending a negative
message. Because wishing the worker the best of good health can be
taken to signal the prospective employer that the prospect has a
health problem, that expression is forbidden.
Germany, as do many other countries, has a wrongful discharge
law. As one might expect, cases in which the evaluative content of a
reference are in issue are almost invariably cases involving discharge
and so reference claims are usually conjoined with wrongful dis-
charge claims. Table 2 sets out the number of wrongful discharge
claims brought before the labor courts for the period 1996-2006, and
the number of wrongful reference claims in that period; note that the
same plaintiff may have brought both.
The sheer number of these claims, which have spiked in recent
years, 72 seems daunting for the legal system to handle given Ver-
72. Grotmann-Hofling has examined the reasons for this spike as possibly ex-
plained by the extension of the law to the former East German states which had
lacked a similar requirement; to the fact that many of the businesses there to which
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TABLE 2: WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS AND REFERENCE
CLAIMS IN GERMANY 1996-2006
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Wrongful
termination 323,322 320,362 294,164 272,022 258,877 270,594 310,432 343,385 328,635 308,091 244,419
claims
Referenceclaims 15,395 15,939 17,585 21,254 23,425 25,878 27,908 30,177 31,540 32,288 30,817
Reference
claims as
% ofwrof 4.8% 5.0% 5.9% 7.8% 9.0% 9.6% 9.0% 8.8% 9.6% 10.5% 12.6%wrongful
discharge
claims
Source: Annual Report of Labor Court Statistics in Arbeit und Recht (AuR) 1997-2007.
kerke's caution on the difficulties of litigating levels of employer
satisfaction. But these data need to be put in the larger context of
turnover in employment. Data are available that disaggregate resig-
nations from involuntary discharges. As the former should be
expected to involve negotiation with the employee about the terms of
the reference, the latter should be expected to trigger the predomi-
nant number of reference disputes. Considering these data, we
estimate that in recent years the terms of the reference are legally
disputed in about four percent of all involuntary discharges. 73
Further insight on how the system works in practice can be
gleaned from the statistics of but one labor court for the year 2000
reported by Grotmann-Hofling, which he takes to be fairly typical. In
that year, 209 reference disputes were filed with the court. Of these
209 cases, 130 were settled, 63 were withdrawn or closed, 13 resulted
the law applies are small to medium enterprises that lack the sophistication of exper-
ienced counsel; to the fact that high and seemingly persistent unemployment may
make it worthwhile or even necessary to contest the content of the reference; and to
the role of lawyers. Gunter Grotmann-H6fling, Wohlwollende Wahrheit: Zeugnisse vor
dem Arbeitsgericht, AuR 2003, p. 210.
73. The Institut fifr Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (LAB) annually surveys
both resignations and discharges. Unfortunately, it collects data for the first half of
the year only. A crude guess at the annual figure would be simply to double these,
there being no seasonality in the half yearly construct. Thus, the estimate of four
percent is made by doubling the number of discharges and measuring the number of
reference claims accordingly. Note that involuntary discharge may be the result of
restructuring or downsizing, i.e., the data do not disaggregate economic terminations
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in default judgments and only 3 were litigated. 74 In terms of how the
labor court process works it should be recalled that there is easy ac-
cess, little cost, and lawyers need not be involved. Nevertheless, it is
instructive to note that in these 209 cases employees chose to be rep-
resented by attorneys in 137 cases and were represented by unions in
30 cases, while employers chose attorney representation in only 30
cases and were represented by an employer association in only 14
cases. Otherwise each party chose to represent itself in conducting
these disputes. 75
C. Reflections on the German Reference System
Let us return to Verkerke's main points regarding the economics
of mandatory reference disclosure: (1) that verification of an em-
ployer's subjective assessments of an employee's performance and
behavior is likely to be an exacting and so a costly process; (2) that
managers might use the threat of negative assessment as a discipli-
nary device; (3) that employers might game the system by giving
unjustified positive references or by offering them as an inducement
to quit, to foist the worker on to another employer; and (4) that any
effort to legislate against the potential for gaming or opportunism by
requiring truthfulness would involve the same transaction costs as
policing negative subjective assessments, and "might prevent em-
from terminations due to incompetence or misconduct. Portions of the relevant LAB
data are set out below.
Personnel Outflow in Germany in the First Half of a Year (in thousands)
1960 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Resignation
on the part 598 587 546 858 778 736 583 460 388 357 408
of the
employee
Dismissal
on the part 497 509 439 458 422 489 495 522 444 414 364
of the
employer
Expiration
of a
temporary 253 239 210 342 266 293 314 278 299 264 247
employment
contract
Termination
of a contract 182 168 130 153 110 110 116 105 95 95 72
by mutual
agreement
SOURCE: LAB Annual Surveys.
74. Grotmann-Hofling, supra note 72, at 213.
75. Id. The significance of these data is unclear. Large companies tend to have in-
house counsel and so employer self-representation in the case of larger companies
might be by legally trained company personnel or, perhaps, by human resource man-
agers who have been legally counseled.
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ployers from signaling their level of satisfaction with former
employees by providing positive references with different degrees of
enthusiasm."76 Are these borne out in the German experience?
On the first, the snapshot of the sample labor court's docket
shows that these cases are rarely litigated, perhaps due to the time
and expense of litigation; for the most part the parties negotiate and
settle on what the reference will say. Because the reference obligation
is woven into the fabric of wrongful discharge law, a feature not pre-
sent in the United States, the use of this obligation as a bargaining
chip by dismissed employees to enhance their entitlement to sever-
ance pay, common in Germany, would not be present here.
As to the second proposition, it is fair to assume that the prospect
of a negative evaluation could be used as a device to discipline the
workforce; but that use is mitigated by the legal obligation of truth-
fulness as well as benevolence, by the cost the employee can impose
on the employer by challenging the reference's terms, and by the risk
of money damages should the reference (or the want of one) cost the
employee a job.
On the third proposition, the Germans are well aware of the pos-
sibility that an employer might sing an incompetent employee's
praises in order to get rid of her. In fact, there is a verb-wegloben
(literally "to praise away")-that means just that.7 7 But the sheer
number of reference cases brought belies the idea that employers rou-
tinely game the system that way. It appears that the obligation of
truthfulness does play a role in what employers say, howsoever
hedged by individual bargaining within the confines of the semiotic
system. This may be because of the prospect of potential liability to
the ultimate employer for an intentional infliction of damages for an
omission that is contrary to good morals. The only precedents are of
some vintage and only reach silence regarding criminal activity; even
so, they stand as a brooding omnipresence of the possible reach of
§826 BGB. On the imponderable of "intent" under that provision, a
practical guide advises: "The more serious the reference's inaccuracy
for the prospective employer's well being ... the greater would the
prior employer's knowledge be that others would be deceived by it."78
If a bookkeeper, whose woeful incompetence has cost an employer
dearly, is praised by that employer with an intention of foisting her
off on another, the second employer conceivably might be able to se-
cure recompense from the reference-giver for the economic loss the
employee has caused. Ironically, the prospect of third party liability
may have the unintended effect of deterring an employer from saying
76. Verkerke, supra note 3, at 168.
77. DIETZ, supra note 62, at 17.
78. Schlej'mann, supra note 62, at 164, citing an intermediate civil appellate
court decision of 1982.
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just how good she thinks an employee is lest the employee un-
derperform in her new position to that employer's detriment.
In other words, the German system solves the coordination prob-
lem much as a market mechanism might if the market did not suffer
from the transaction costs and information asymmetries that limit a
purely private solution to the problem. Verkerke observes of a pri-
vately negotiated shared reference pool that, "[a]fter hiring a job
applicant, the recipient of a reference ordinarily would discover a for-
mer employer's failure to disclose negative information. Presumably,
too may incidents of nondisclosure would cause the recipient to termi-
nate the reciprocal relationship."7 9 To analogous effect, Dietz
observes of the German system that a prospective employer's selec-
tion of employees on the basis of their references depends in part on
the prior employer's reputation for giving reliable references.80
Finally, the German experience does not confirm the hypothesis
that an obligation of truthfulness will deter employers from signaling
their levels of satisfaction. For the reason just discussed, both ex-
traordinarily high praise and outright condemnation are most
unusual. An employee subject to the latter would be more likely to
ask for an unqualified reference; and an employer who would like to
give an unusually strong recommendation might bear liability if the
employee performs unexpectedly badly. It would take courage to
break with the code and say what one really thinks in plain lan-
guage;81 and so long as lawyers have a hand in the matter, that
courage is rarely manifested.8 2 The result, however, is communica-
tion couched in "reference speak" that, once decoded, sends a signal
along a finely calibrated scale of levels of performance.
IV. THE PROPOSAL: A STATE-SPONSORED "REFERENCE POOL"
As Verkerke argues, and the German experience confirms, the
law is incapable of mandating a "first best" solution to the reference
problem. Any system can be gamed or can have unintended conse-
quences. But is a second best solution possible? The desiderata are to
have the law induce employers to be more forthcoming with refer-
ences whilst striving for a balance of accuracy in the information
conveyed and fairness to the persons affected by it-at as low trans-
action costs as possible.
A mandatory reference law on the German model may not be a
workable second best solution in the United States: it would allow
both employers and employees to game the system-by giving the for-
79. Verkerke, supra note 3, at 172 (footnote omitted).
80. DIETZ, supra note 62, at 17.
81. Schweres, supra note 70, at 1572.
82. Thomas Schraeder, Zur Steigerung der Zahl der Zeugnisrechtestreite, AuR
2000, p. 214.
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mer a disciplinary cudgel and by giving the latter an entitlement that
would allow rent-seeking-when they see it in their interest so to be-
have.8 3 Even so, the German experience confirms the intuition that
employers will exchange information about employees that can be ac-
curate and fair when they see it is in their interest to do so and that
the law can play a role facilitating that exchange. Let us see how that
can be done in the U.S. context.
The first element of the proposal is for the state legislatively to
create a reference pool, housed, perhaps, in the state's department of
labor or similar administrative entity. The costs of the system would
be paid by the participating employers and participation would be
voluntary: those employers submitting references to the pool would
have the right to draw references from the pool. This would solve the
coordination problem.
Second, information technology would make submission, access,
and retrieval automatic. In fact, the resulting reference database
might allow participating employers to search the job market for em-
ployees with specific skills, experience, and records of job
performance.
A complicating factor is the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.8 4
Insofar as a "consumer reporting agency" covered by the Act includes
an entity that assembles information to be furnished to third parties
for employment purposes, not only for a fee but "on a cooperative non-
profit basis,"8 5 the fact that the pool is a state agency might not
exempt it.86 The problem is that the FCRA requires notice to and
consent of an employee or prospective employee to the preparation of
a report8 7 which would seem to require employee consent before a
prospective employer could search the database. What little law there
is, however, holds that blanket consent given to an incumbent em-
ployer to undertake a check at any time in the future complies with
the Act.88 There is no reason why consent to release of the reference
into the pool would not work as statutory consent for retrieval from
the pool by a prospective employer not yet known to the employee. If
this reading were disallowed, the applicant would have to consent to
each prospective employer's recourse to the pool's database and, if the
reference was believed to be too harmful, he or she could decline to
consent. Even if the statute were read to require an employer-by-em-
83. Our dubiety about the effectiveness of this legal mandate rests in part on the
fact that "the American tradition does not encourage obedience to the state and to the
law." SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 93 (1996).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
85. Id. § 1681(a)(f).
86. Cf Lewis v. Ohio Professional Elec. Network LLC, 190 F.Supp. 2d 1049 (S.D.
Ohio 2002).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(B)(ii).
88. Kelcher v. Sycamore Manor Health Center, 305 F. Supp. 2d 429 (M.D. Pa.
2004) affd mem. (3d Cir. 2005).
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ployer consent or to disallow any disclosure not expressly consented
to, the law would come close to the German model: instead of al-
lowing employees to request an unqualified or qualified reference, the
database would indicate that the employee had embargoed it.
The agency administering the pool system could, in consultation
with employers, employer associations, unions, and other interested
groups, devise a standard form requesting the respondent to supply
the information employers most commonly seek, perhaps along the
line of the ten questions posed in Table 1. Note that some of this re-
quests specific, factually verifiable information-job qualifications,
absenteeism rates, incidents of violence, eligibility for rehire-even
as others seek more subjective appraisals of skills and traits. Solicita-
tion of additional information or comment on matters not specifically
addressed in the form could also be made.
Third, the affected employees would be given their references,
would have the right to request a correction, and, if uncorrected,
would have the right to a hearing on the accuracy and fairness of the
reference before a hearing officer, as is commonly provided in unem-
ployment compensation challenges, or an arbitrator. An absolute
privilege would be applied to references issued through the pool if
they have not been made subject to a timely demand for correction or
after correction made voluntarily or pursuant to administrative or ar-
bitral order. In sum, the reference pool would provide an immunity
bath.
The idea that the employee should see the information conveyed
about her is scarcely novel. The federal Fair Credit Reporting Act re-
quires that prospective employees on whom prospective employers
wish to run background checks be given a copy of the report and be
given the opportunity to demand a correction;8 9 and the reporting
agency is required to inform the requesting prospective employer
that the information is disputed. 90 Further, nineteen American juris-
dictions require private sector employees to be allowed to inspect
their personnel records;91 ten states allow employees to demand a
correction of the information contained in their files and, in the event
of employer disagreement, provide for inclusion of a written explana-
tory statement by the employee. 92
But more is needed. The value to the employee of adding a writ-
ten notice of disputed fact or corrective explanation is of dubious
value insofar as it does or might merely draw the prospective em-
ployer's attention to the dispute-and to the prospect's
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1681, 1681 to (2006).
90. Id. § 1681(c).
91. The statutes are compiled in FINKIN, supra note 6, at 717-56.
92. They are Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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disputatiousness. As Terry Halbert and Lewis Maltby have observed,
"Most employees will realize that it is not in their best interests to
add a rebuttal to their file, since by doing this they automatically flag
themselves as potential troublemakers, and lower their own chances
of getting hired again."93 Thus a relatively swift and inexpensive
means of checking the reference's accuracy and fairness should be
available.
Again, such corrective action is scarcely unknown in American
law: at-will public employees who are stigmatized by dismissal and
whose stigma then affects their ability to gain employment elsewhere
are constitutionally entitled to a "name clearing" hearing in which to
set the record straight 94-ndeed it has been held that the mere pres-
ence of falsely damaging information in the employee's personnel file
triggers the right to a name-clearing hearing. 95 Military personnel
may contest the content of military records;96 the federal Privacy Act
allows for the correction of facts (but not opinions) contained in fed-
eral employee records. 97 Department of Labor administrative review
boards commonly order employers to delete all information pertain-
ing to wrongful discharges under the Surface Transportation Act.98
Labor arbitrators routinely order that employee records be corrected
or expunged;99 indeed, an arbitral order noted earlier in this essay
ordered that a stockbroker's Form U-5 be expunged. 100 And two
states, Massachusetts and Michigan, allow employees to have their
personnel files cleared of information the employer "knew or should
93. Terry Ann Halbert & Lewis Maltby, Reference Check Gridlock: A Proposal For
Escape, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 395, 413 (1998). Note the advice DAC Ser-
vices gives to truckers in exercising their rebuttal rights under the Federal Fair
Credit Reporting Act: "You're within your rights to provide a rebuttal statement for
each and every entry on the report but be careful. Too many rebuttals on a report may
be viewed by potential employers as being more negative than minor adverse informa-
tion." Supra note 48.
94. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S .564, 573 (1972) as refined by Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976) and Codd v.Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977). See, e.g., Brandt v. Board
of Co-Op Educ., 820 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1987).
95. Sciolino v. City of Newport News, 480 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 2007).
96. 10 U.S.C. § 1552.
97. McCready v. Nicolson, 465 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006); cf Mueller v. Winter, 485
F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
98. Griffith v. Atlantic Inland Carrier, DOL Administrative Review Board Case
No. 04-010, Recommended Decision and Order (Oct. 21, 2003) at 28-29.
99. In a case where an employer of casual labor wrongfully placed an employee on
"do not refer" for future employment status with the union, and circulated that notice
to at least one other employer of union-referred labor in the industry, an arbitrator
ordered not only any reference to the letter be expunged from the employee's person-
nel file but also ordered that a letter of retraction be sent to all persons to whom the
earlier notice had been sent. Shepard Exposition Service, 122 LA 1725 (Nicholas
Duda, Arb., 2006).
100. See Rosensweig v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., supra note 38.
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have known to be false" in Massachusetts 10 1 or of knowingly false
information in Michigan. 10 2
In lieu of administrative hearing, the labor pool could maintain a
roster of experienced arbitrators to resolve reference disputes. The
costs of arbitration would be borne by the employer save that the em-
ployee might be required to pay a filing fee as a partial deterrent to
frivolous claims. The cost of an arbitration should be modest 10 3 as
compared to the cost of civil litigation; and apportioning the pool's
cost by experience rating, if administrative adjudication were part of
the scheme, or having the employer bear the arbitration fee and ex-
penses might in either case mitigate an employer's avidity to use the
prospect of false negatives as a disciplinary device.
Moreover, the statute should make it clear that an administra-
tive or arbitral determination of the accuracy of a reference would not
be determinative in any wrongful discharge or discrimination claim
the employee might bring. To give the reference decision such preclu-
sive effect would mutate a low stakes game into a high stakes one,
one likely to ratchet up both cost and delay to the point that it would
not be worth the candle.
The greater imponderable is delay as no reference could be
drawn from the pool while the employee contested its content. Even
so, the employee would not be disadvantaged vis-a-vis those prospec-
tive employers who were not participants in the pool. Further, the
reference pool administrator could police the expedition with which
cases are heard; and there is a good deal of experience with expedited
arbitration systems that could be looked to as well.
Thus far, the proposed system would solve the false negative
problem. But what about false positives?
If the German experience is relevant, the problem of gaming the
system in this way can be expected to be moderated by two considera-
tions. First, American jurisdictions seem to be at 6s and 7s today on
whether a duty of full disclosure applies to a reference and, if so, con-
cerning what matters and under what circumstances. The reference
101. Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 149, § 52C.
102. Mich. Comp. L., § 423.505.
103. It takes about a day of arbitral time to hear the average case under collective
bargaining agreements, many concerning just cause to dismiss. Set out below are the
average arbitral fees and expenses per case for the five-year period 2002-2006. There
is no reason to believe that deciding the accuracy and fairness of a job reference
should be any more difficult than deciding whether an employee was dismissed for
just cause.
Average Labor Arbitral Fee and Expense Per Case
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
$3,202 $3,412 $3,542 $3,733 $3,940
Source: FMCS (includes travel, hearing, study and decision time compensated on a
per diem basis).
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pool law, which extends an absolute privilege in any suit brought by
the employee, need not take a position on what the rule need be; but
it could extend the absolute privilege toward any third party-the
prospective employer, its employees or clients-concerning a refer-
ence that an adjudicative administrator or arbitrator has determined
to be accurate and fair. In principle, the employer is thus at risk of
legal uncertainty regarding information it chooses not to disclose; but
the law would create a safe harbor for undisclosed information if 1)
the employer originally disclosed such information in the reference,
2) it was contested, and 3) then excised by administrative order or
arbitral award. 10 4 This is illustrated in the Mabton 10 5 case, discussed
earlier. Assume the school district had supplied a reference to the
reference pool that said that the custodian had "resigned on condition
of the withdrawal of what the school district believed were baseless
criminal charges of child molestation." Assume further that the cus-
todian objected to the fairness of the reference, that an arbitrator
agreed with the custodian and ordered that portion to be excised. In
that case, the prior employer would enjoy absolute immunity in any
future lawsuit brought by the custodian's subsequent employer or
other third party based on the reference's failure to mention those
circumstances.
A second factor moderating the prospect of participating employ-
ers gaming the system by routinely giving positive references is the
fact that the pool is self-selecting and subject to administrative over-
sight. Because it is self-selecting, it should be expected that the
companies to opt in would be those more likely to see the benefits of
mutual exchange of good information. As the German experience
teaches, the reputational effect on employers who try to use the sys-
tem to foist bad workers on to others is, in practice, part of the
system. Because the system is subject to administrative oversight, an
104. It was just noted that any reference to the employee's engagement in pro-
tected activity as the ground of discharge is commonly ordered excised from the
employee's personnel record by administrative law judges enforcing the anti-retalia-
tion protection of federal transportation safety law. Griffith v. Atlantic Inland
Carrier, supra note 98. In that case, the ALJ also dealt with the company's participa-
tion in the DAC Services termination information pool discussed in supra note 48. In
Griffith, the dismissed truck driver requested that his DAC form be corrected to indi-
cate that he was eligible for rehire, in response to one of the standard entries on the
form. The AU observed that
if this notation were included on Complainant's DAC record, this would indi-
cate to future employers that there was a period of time where Complainant
was not employed by Respondent without any further explanation, and may
be cause for subsequent explanation by Complainant. Therefore, I will in-
stead order that Respondent shall delete any reference to eligibility for
rehire. In the event that Complainant should choose not to be reinstated by
Respondent, only then should a notation be made on Complainant's DAC re-
cord, that he left in good standing and is eligible for rehire.
Id. at 29.
105. Supra note 29.
416 [Vol. 57
HeinOnline -- 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 416 2009
2009] SOLVING THE EMPLOYEE REFERENCE PROBLEM 417
employer whose positive recommendations are subject to a significant
pattern of negative experience reported to the pool administrator by
those employers who have relied on them could be barred from fur-
ther participation.
Consistent with the incidence of actual litigation in the United
States, and consistent with the German experience, the percentage of
employees contesting their references should be small. Thus, the po-
tential cost to participating employers is of an occasional arbitration
over the content of a reference-neither the prospect of significant
tort damages nor even the high expenses of civil litigation-in return
for which the employer receives absolute tort immunity and gets the
benefit of reciprocal access to accurate information in the labor mar-
ket. In addition, the availability of reliable references may reduce the
need for companies to resort to other background checks, thereby re-
ducing the overall transaction costs of the hiring process.
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